● confidential compute rooted in silicon, not a provider

attestation-service

attestation service

verifiable eat receipts for arbitrary source

submit a source tarball; an ephemeral intel tdx vm shadow-builds it inside the tee and returns a signed eat receipt binding the build output to a hardware quote. the build host is not trusted — only the cpu vendor root is.

$ attestation-service

$ curl -F src=@app.tar.gz https://<service>/v1/attest
{ "verdict": "verified", "eat": "…", "mrtd": "…" }

source → silicon

$ verify-source-to-silicon · two roots, one value_x

release: azure-tee-build provenance: sigstore azure sev-snp · amd root

value_x dde6f4c1ce11a0a21bb02384e1440189232984eb5b7659d877725ded0c204b87

built in-tee by a self-hosted runner · github build provenance binds the same digest

live: attested-TLS at https://attest.secure.build:8443/ · the leaf cert is the evidence

$ ./scripts/verify-source-to-silicon.sh
# [1/4] azure sev-snp → amd root  · value_x_bound true
# [3/4] gh attestation verify       · maceip/attestation-service (self-hosted, in-tee)
# PASS: source → silicon — github provenance D == hardware value_x

the stack

authorizationeat-pass
agent platformcvm-agent
attestation serviceattestation-service (here)
quote formatunified-quote
in-tee runtimeattested-workload

agentic canon

no proof, no privilege.
make behavior enforceable · turn failures into evolution · compose through proofs · carry trust forward.