● anonymous authorization attested, unlinkable, one-time

eat-pass

authorization tokens
privacy pass, gated on hardware attestation

an origin that wants to accept requests only from a genuine, attested build — without learning which client — needs anonymous authorization. eat-pass mints RFC 9578 blind-RSA tokens that are issued only for a request carrying a valid unified-quote attestation for an accepted measurement, and are unlinkable at redemption and spendable once. think Google Aratea / Apple ARC, rooted in the CPU vendor instead of a platform operator.

$ eat-pass demo · issuer → client → origin, in-process
# no network, no tee — the whole flow end to end
$ cargo run -p eat-pass-cli -- demo
attest PASS · gate PASS · blind-sign PASS · finalize 3 tokens
origin   token accepted + spent · replay rejected (double-spend)
$ live · token gated on a real azure sev-snp build (in-cvm)
# client inside the CVM binds value_x = channel binding via the vTPM AK quote
$ eat-pass issuer --gate azure --allow 41f77fe5…f4fab503 &
$ eat-pass token --attest azure --present http://origin/resource
[uq/azure] verdict verified · sig PASS · chain PASS # vcek → ask → ark-milan
[uq/azure] measurement 41f77fe5…f4fab503 · value_x_bound true
minted 1 token(s)
present → origin: 200 OK # access granted: attested, unlinkable, one-time
$ key transparency · rotation stays consistent
# clients pin the LOG key (one, long-lived) — not every issuer key
$ eat-pass token --kt-log-pub d04ab232… --kt-known-head 0:420245c2…
kt OK — issuer key included at seq 1, head signed by pinned key
kt OK — log is consistent with previously-seen head seq 0 # post-rotation
# /keys/1 still serves the retired key so old tokens still verify

how the binding reaches the silicon

a captured attestation must not be replayable against a different blind request. the per-request channel binding is folded into the hardware quote, so the AMD/Intel signature itself vouches for this issuance:

binding = sha256(blinded token inputs)        # per /sign request
   │
   ▼
report_data[0..32] / AK qualifyingData = binding   # hardware-signed
   │  unified-quote verifies → AMD/Intel root
   ▼
gate accepts measurement → blind-sign          # RFC 9474 RSABSSA
# result: token issued only for an attested build, unlinkable on redemption

the stack

agentic canon

agentic canon — no proof, no privilege
no proof, no privilege.
make behavior enforceable · turn failures into evolution · compose through proofs · carry trust forward.